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DAMAGES-Compensation for Curtailment of Life 
Expectancy as a Separate Element of Damages 
-Downie v. United States Lines Co.* 
[Vol. 65 
While plaintiff was aboard ship as an employee of the defendant, 
he suffered a heart attack which was aggravated by the negligence 
of one of defendant's employees. In suing under the Jones Act1 for 
damages caused by this aggravation of his condition, plaintiff sought 
recovery for the eight year curtailment of his life expectancy as a 
separate and distinct item of damages, independent of the economic 
loss sustained as a result of such curtailment. The jury made a gen-
eral award of $86,900 of which $25,000 was a special award for the 
curtailment of plaintiff's life. On defendant's motion, the trial judge 
eliminated this special award and entered judgment on the verdict 
as modified. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
held, reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages 
because of inadequate instructions.2 Diminution of life expectancy is 
not of itself a separately compensable item of damages, but may be 
considered by the jurors in measuring other areas of damages. 
Where negligence results in the curtailment of a person's life 
expectancy, English courts have granted compensation to the in-
jured person for the nonpecuniary loss of enjoyment and happiness 
denied him by the shortening of his life, but have not allowed him 
to recover the lost earnings for the period cut from his normal life.3 
• 359 F.2d 344 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 201 (1966), reversing 231 F. Supp. 
192 (E.D. Pa. 1964) [hereinafter referred to as principal case]. 
1. Jones Act § 20, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). 
2. Principal case at 348. The instructions were deemed inadequate because they 
permitted the jury to give a recovery for curtailment of life expectancy as a separate 
item rather than limiting consideration of curtailment to being only one factor among 
many which could be drawn upon in reaching a fair award. 
3. Separate damages for the psychic loss of life expectancy were first allowed in 
Flint v. Lovell, [1935] 1 K.B. 354. The House of Lords approved such awards and 
distinguished them from pain and suffering in Rose v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826, where 
the administrator of the victim, who was unconscious until death, was allowed to 
recover these damages under a survival act. In 1941, the House of Lords called for 
moderation and restraint in the awarding of such damages in Benham v. Gambling, 
[1941] A.C. 157, where a £1,200 award for a deceased two year old was reduced to £200. 
Although there was a period of uncertainty over whether damages for lost earnings 
were to be measured only in terms of the shortened life or in terms of the normal 
pre-accident life span, the Court of Appeals in Oliver v. Ashman, [1961] 3 Weekly L.R. 
669 (C.A.), made it clear that the shortened life span was to be used. See Annots., 
131 A.L.R. 1351 (1941); 97 A.L.R. 823 (1935); Hannigan, Recent English Decisions 
in Damages for Injuries Ending in Premature Death, 18 B.U.L. REv. 275 (1938). 
The English argue that the injury has affected the plaintiff's capacity to suffer loss. 
Just as he can suffer no pain and mental anguish during these "lost years," so too he 
cannot suffer the loss of earnings (only his surviving dependents can suffer this loss), 
for it is exactly this power to suffer loss, to experience pain, or to enjoy happiness 
of which the victim has been deprived. Hence, the only compensation that should be 
given the injured party is compensation for his psychic loss. The English system may 
leave the surviving dependents unprotected, for under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 
&: 10 Viet. c. 93, the dependents are allowed to recover their loss of support if the de-
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American courts, on the other hand, refuse to compensate for the 
psychic loss of the enjoyable experiences of life, but do permit com-
pensation for the more easily measured lost earnings that the in-
jured party would have acquired had he lived an unaltered span 
of life.4 The first American case that dealt with the question of 
damages for loss of life expectancy was Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker, 
in which the Indiana Supreme Court rejected diminution of life 
expectancy as a separate heading of damages and reversed a judg-
ment of $4,600 for an eighty-five year old woman injured in a gas 
explosion.5 The court indicated that although curtailment of life 
could be considered as a factor in measuring the severity of the 
injury and the present and future pain and suffering, it was not by 
itself an independently compensable item. The only cases cited by 
the court were those which had applied the common law doctrine of 
Baker v. Bolton that "in a civil court the death of a human being 
cedent had a cause of action at the time of his death, but if the decedent settled or 
obtained a recovery before death, his dependents are barred from suit and neither the 
deceased nor the surviving dependents receive any part of the earnings these "lost 
years" would have provided. See British Elec. Ry. v. Gentile, [1914] A.C. 1034 (P.C.); 
Williams v. Mersey Docks & Harbour Bd., [1905] I K.B. 804. If the deceased did not 
recover before death, his dependents may recover for the lost support under the Fatal 
Accidents Act and the decedent's administrator may also sue on the surviving cause of 
action under the Law Reform (Misc. Provisions) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 41. Any 
recovery the dependents receive under the survival act for the decedent's loss of the 
expectation of life or pain and suffering will be deducted from their recovery under 
the death act. If, however, the decedent bequeathed the residue of his estate to non-
dependents, or numerous creditors were owed, or no dependents survived, the recovery 
for loss of life expectancy and pain and suffering will pass to a stranger or distant 
heir. See Boberg, Damages Occasioned by Shortened (or Lengthened) Expectation 
of Life: A New Case and Some Further Thoughts, 79 S.A.L.J. 43 (1962); Howroyd, 
Damages for Pecuniary Loss Occasioned by Shortened Expectation of Life, 77 S.A.L.J. 
448 (1960); Assessment of Damages in Fata'/: Accidents, 100 L.J. 312 (1950); 1962 CAMB. 
L.J. 153; 25 MODERN L. REv. 479 (1962); 25 MODERN L. REV. 108 (1962). It should be 
noted that courts of Canada and South Africa have also accepted the English rule. 
Mackenzie v. Harbour & B.C. Elec. Ry., [1938] 53 B.C. 88, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 786; .Barr v. 
Miller, [1938] 46 Man. 260, [1938] 4 D.L.R. 278; Lockhat's Estate v. North British & 
Mercantile Ins. Co., [1959] 3 So. Afr. L.R. 295; Goldie v. City Council of Johannesburg, 
[1948] 2 So. Afr. L.R. 913 (1947). 
4. Rhone v. Fisher, 224 Md. 223, 167 A.2d 773 (1961); Borcherding v. Eklund, 156 
Neb. 196, 55 N.W.2d 643 (1952). Since the American courts compensate for lost earn-
ings based on the normal pre-accident life span, the total economic loss caused by 
the injury is compensated and the dependents can be provided for. In fact there is 
overcompensation since the personal expenses or maintenance of the victim during the 
"lost years" have been avoided by his death. If American courts grant separate damages 
for the psychic loss due to curtailment of life, an adjustment of the economic loss 
would be in order so that the future living expenses avoided by the earlier death are 
deducted from the victim's award for lost earnings. For an excellent article which 
advocates an extension of legal protection to cover the psychic loss caused by the 
curtailment of life, see Smith, Psychic Interest in Continuation of One's Own Life: 
Legal Recognition and Protection, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 781 (1950). See generally Fleming, 
The Lost Years: A Problem in the Computation and Distribution of Damages, 50 
CALIF. L. REv. 598 (1962); Comment, The Measure of Damages for a Shortened Life, 
22 U. CHI. L. REv. 505 (1954). 
5. 146 Ind. 600, 45 N.E. 1049 (1897). It was undetermined what proportion of the 
judgment was for the curtailment of life. 
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cannot be complained of as an injury."6 This doctrine, which was 
traditionally used to deny survivors any tort damages for the death 
of another person, has been greatly criticized7 and in fact overturned 
by modern death acts. The Indiana court, however, accepted the 
appellant's argument that the common law did not allow recovery 
for the death of another as well as his contention that the common 
law did not allow recovery for the shortening of one's own life.8 
This latter assertion cannot be substantiated, for although there are 
no cases cited allowing such a recovery, no cases have been found 
at English common law that deny recovery for curtailment of life;9 
indeed, Lord Wright, in his opinion in Rose v. Ford, stated that he 
thought such damages had been previously allowed to a living plain-
tiff without objection.10 The Indiana court, deluded by the common 
law hostility to recovery for death, failed to recognize that its plain-
tiff was still very much alive and that authority concerning deceased 
victims was simply inapplicable to its case. This initial error was 
perpetuated by several subsequent cases which relied upon the be-
clouded reasoning of Richmond Gas without truly analyzing its 
validity.11 
More modem cases that have been decided by courts less influ-
enced by the old distaste for causes of action dealing with death 
have summoned additional and more adequate reasons for denying 
this separate heading of damages. One court said that the intangible 
nature of enjoyment of continued life and related problems of 
assessment provide boundless opportunities for arbitrary and exces-
sive awards.12 Another court reasoned that if such a heading of 
damages existed, it would have passed under that jurisdiction's sur-
vival statute, thereby bringing substantial awards to the estate and 
rendering unnecessary a death act that was enacted to insure the 
dependents' security.13 Other courts point to the difficulty the Brit-
ish courts have had in measuring such damages.14 Finally, in the 
6. I Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). 
7. See, e.g., Hooper v. Gorham, 45 Me. 209, 212 (1858); Harris v. Nashville Trust 
Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 581, 162 S.W. 584, 586 (1914); PROSSER, TORTS § 121 (3d ed. 1964); 
Duffey, Life Expectancy and Loss of Earning Capacity, 19 OHIO ST. L. REv. 314, 321 
(1958). 
8. Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker, 146 Ind. 600, 608, 45 N.E. 1049, 1052 (1897); see 
principal case at 349. 
9. Smith, supra note 4, at 783. 
10. Rose v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826, 848-49. 
11. Krakowski v. Aurora, E. 8: C. Ry., 167 Ill. App. 469 (1912); Lake Erie 8: W.R.R. 
v. Johnson, 191 Ind. 479, 133 N.E. 732 (1922); Cleveland, C., C. 8: St. L. Ry. v. Miller, 
165 Ind. 381, 74 N.E. 509 (1905); Muncie Pulp Co. v. Hacker, 37 Ind. App. 194, 76 N.E. 
770 (1906). 
12. Ham v. Maine-New Hampshire Interstate Bridge Auth., 92 N.H. 268, 30 A.2d 
I (1943). 
13. Farrington v. Stoddard, 115 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1940). The court, applying Maine 
law, cited as support Ramsdell v. Grady, 97 Me. 319, 54 Atl. 763 (1903), which held 
that it was clearly settled that recovery for loss of life expectancy could not be claimed, 
but did not give any authority or convincing reasons. 
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principal case, the majority rejected this separate heading of dam-
ages because of its "incalculable variables" and the danger of "base 
speculation. "15 
The soundness and force of these arguments against independent 
recovery were challenged in the principal case in a vigorous dissent 
by Chief Judge Kalodner16 who found our current scheme of award-
ing damages inadequate insofar as it attempts to compensate for 
curtailment of life only by indirect damage awards. American deci-
sions have allowed the jury to take shortening of life into account 
in order to determine the general extent or severity of the injury, 
the damages for pain and suffering and mental anguish, and its 
effect on the victim's future earnings.17 However, such limited con-
sideration of the curtailment of life deals only with the economic 
damages and lowered quality of the remaining years and fails to 
reach the positive future loss of several years of life itself.18 Further-
more, since evidence on the curtailment of life may be presented in 
court in connection with proof of other elements of damage, juries 
have an opportunity to adjust other damage awards either con-
sciously or unconsciously so as to give a recovery for the lost years 
notwithstanding instructions that damages for the lost years are not 
recoverable.19 If the jury is able to consider loss of life expectancy 
as a factor in determining damages, such consideration should be 
14. O'Leary v. United States Lines Co., 111 F. Supp. 745 (D. Mass. 1953); Rhone v. 
Fisher, 224 Md. 223, 167 A.2d 773 (1961). These two cases point to the limitations on 
recovery for loss of life expectancy since the call for moderation by the House of Lords 
in the Benham case. Awards that used to be £1,000 or more are presently limited to 
£200 to £500. Diplock, L.J., in Wise v. Kaye, [1962] I All E.R. 257 (C.A.), failed in his 
attempt to raise a £400 award for loss of life expectancy of a twenty year old girl to a 
more realistic level of £1,000. 0. Kahn-Freund criticizes the English rule in his article 
Expectation of Happiness, 5 MODERN L. REv. 81 (1941), and claims that since English 
custom will not allow the reversal of a prior decision, the House of Lords eliminated 
damages for loss of life expectancy by emasculating them into token sums. 
15. Principal case at 347. 
16. Id. at 348-51. The dissent was joined by Judge Staley. 
17. Rhone v. Fisher, 224 Md. 223, 167 A.2d 773 (1961); see Smith, supra note 4, at 
794-803. Indeed, the court in the principal case in remanding the case for trial on the 
issue of damages indicated that curtailment of life expectancy might be a factor to 
be considered though it did not indicate how it was to be considered. Principal case 
at 348. 
18. Conceptually, damages for the general extent or severity of the injury do not 
cover the "lost years" but rather deal with injury to the quality of the remaining 
years. An award for the loss of earning capacity fails to compensate for the separate, 
nonpecuniary damage to the psychic or personal dimension of life, and merely com-
pensates the economic dimension of the years lost. Damages for physiological pain and 
suffering cannot compensate for the non-physical psychic loss of prospective happiness. 
Even an award for increased mental anguish proves inadequate for it does not com-
pensate for the positive future loss of life's very substance but rather merely compen-
sates the victim for his present, subjective mental attitude toward this loss; mental 
anguish is the suffering encountered before death, not the loss of the experiences and 
expressions of the personality that would have occurred but for the premature death. 
See Smith, supra note 4, at 794. . 
19. See the instruction used in Rhone v. Fisher, 224 Md. 223, 226, 167 A.2d 773, 775 
(1961); Smith, supra note 4, at 795. 
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done openly under proper instructions which define, limit, and 
distinguish the curtailment of life expectancy as a separate area of 
damages. 
Courts are beginning to allow recovery for the purely psychic 
loss to an injured or crippled plaintiff of such creative or pleasur-
able pursuits as dancing, taking long walks, or playing tennis.20 The 
majority in the principal case recognizes the rule of compensation 
for the loss of such specific amenities of life and adds that "justice 
demands the application of a similar rule where, as in the instant 
case, an element of the permanent disability is the consequent cur-
tailment of life expectancy."21 Thus a few enumerated amenities 
lost by the curtailment of life are compensable, but the other innu-
merable experiences and pleasures of life that are denied the victim 
go uncompensated. The illogic of this result is pointed out by Judge 
Kalodner's dissent: 
I cannot subscribe to a doctrine which sanctions compensation for 
"inability to dance, bowl, swim or engage in similar recreational 
activities" but denies compensation for the loss of the right to life 
itself ...• 
The distilled essence of the majority's doctrine is that the part 
is greater than the whole; that the fragments of life which it speci-
fies have ascertainable value, but that the total fabric and structure 
of life itself has no separate ascertainable value.22 
The loss or crippling of a bodily member, pain and suffering, loss 
of consortium, fear, humiliation, and loss of specific amenities of 
life all entail psychic losses in that they lower the quality of life 
by narrowing the breadth of normal experience, and courts have 
held such losses compensable.23 Fullness of life is also denied when 
the wrongful act lessens the quantity of life by shortening its nor-
mal length, but, ironically, when the personality suffers the absolute 
and inescapable loss of several years of life itself, the law denies 
compensation. 
Yet, what is the meaning or place of compensation when the 
20. See, e.g., Dagnello v. Long Island R.R., 289 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1961) (Disfigure-
ment from amputation of a leg and loss of normal recreational activities may be con-
sidered in awarding damages); Kasiski v. Central Jersey Power and Light Co., 4 N.J. 
Misc. 130, 132 Atl. 201 (Sup. Ct. 1926) (Impairment of the ability to enter into and 
enjoy boyhood games and pastimes may be considered); Galveston Elec. Co. v. Briggs, 
14 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (Inability to dance, play tennis, walk for any con-
siderable time may be considered); Annot., 120 A.L.R. 535 (1939). However, many 
courts do not recognize separate damages for the loss of the enjoyment or amenities 
of life, and several of the courts granting such damages would probably restrict them 
to specific pleasures lost during the remainder of the shortened life rather than for 
the loss of pleasures based on the normal life span. 
21. Principal case at 348. 
22. Id. at 350. 
23, McCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 88-92 (1935). 
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very substance of life itself is being considered?24 The broad goal 
of compensation is to put the plaintiff, as nearly as is possible, in 
the same position he would have been in had the defendant not 
injured him.215 However, one suffering loss of life expectancy can 
no more be put in his former position than one who has suffered 
pain, the loss of an arm, or various other non-pecuniary losses. 
Consequently, as a solatium or consolation to express society's sin-
cerity in seeking to protect the victim's bodily and personal integ-
rity, our legal system offers money damages for immeasurable 
losses.26 If money can serve as a solatium, or bring added opportu-
nity for happiness to one whose life has been cut short, it seems 
reasonable to award it as compensation. Yet such solace will not 
be possible in all cases. Therefore, in attempting to solve the prob-
lem of compensation for shortened life, one must take into account 
the capacity of the victim to be compensated. 
The first situation is one in which the victim is alive and con-
scious and his prospects of life continue though in a reduced state. 
By adding a new heading of damages for curtailment of prospective 
life to those damages presently awarded by the courts, this plaintiff 
would be more adequately compensated for his absolute loss of the 
psychic pleasures of life, for in his remaining years he would have 
the opportunity to convert the money damages received into some 
of the lost elements of life. He can use the award to obtain leisure 
so that he may do those things that he has planned to do and add 
enjoyment to the years remaining, thereby replacing some pleasures 
of life denied him by the wrongful act. Such an award is not meaning-
less or overcompensatory in this situation, for it merely makes the 
victim whole-as nearly as money can-with respect to the possible 
joys of life. 
The second situation involves a victim who is either killed im-
mediately or dies before the trial. The loss to his psyche is as abso-
lute as the shortening of life is to the psyche of a living victim, 
but a great difference lies in the fact that the deceased victim is 
beyond compensation. Money damages could not be of any solace 
to him and the court should not convert psychic loss into an eco-
nomic substitute where the victim is dead and thus incapable of 
converting the award into psychic pleasures. The victim's depen-
dents have no legitimate claim to this award, for their loss is that 
24. For arguments against expanding the compensatory theory of damages to areas 
of no monetary dimension and in support of an emerging functional view of damages, 
see Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW &: CoNTEMP. 
PROB. 219 (1953); James, Damages in Accident Cases, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 582 (1956). For 
support of the compensatory system protecting rights of personality, see DeParcq &: 
Wright, Damages Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 17 OHio ST. L.J. 430 
(1956). 
25. McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § 137 (1935). 
26. See Jaffe, supra note 24, at 224. 
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of economic support, services, and their own psychic disturbances; 
no dependent can share the deceased's uniquely individual psychic 
loss.27 Nor should such an award accrue to the estate, for since its 
losses can only be economic, not psychic, such recovery would be 
an unwarranted windfall to the heirs.28 To grant the award where it 
can no longer compensate the personal loss of the deceased is to 
abandon the standard of compensating the injured party for the 
standard of making the wrongdoer pay, and such a justification is 
punitive in nature.29 Possibly an unspoken reason which has 
prompted the courts to refuse recovery for loss of life expectancy 
in any case is the fear that this cause of action will necessarily sur-
vive in those instances when the award has lost its meaning and 
purpose due to the death of the injured party. Yet a distinction 
between the living and deceased victim can be made under our sur-
vival statutes if the courts will recognize the purpose of this special 
award and the uniquely personal loss it seeks to compensate. Under 
survival acts that require both pecuniary and npnpecuniary losses 
for personal injuries to survive,30 a judge could refuse to grant the 
award in cases of common negligence on the ground that such an 
award would be punitive and hence improper.81 Indeed, some juris-
dictions do not allow punitive damages to survive even in cases of 
reckless, willful or wanton conduct, where such exemplary awards 
are normally warranted.32 If the judge were unwilling to distinguish 
between the compensatory and punitive nature of the award in the 
different situations or were to allow the survival of punitive dam-
ages, legislative amendments such as those which have been enacted 
by some states to prevent the survival of pain and suffering awards 
could prevent the claim for curtailment of life from surviving.83 
The third and final situation is the case of a living but uncon-
scious victim.34 Again, consideration must be given to the prospec-
27. See DeParcq & Wright, supra note 24, at 452; Kahn-Freund, supra note 14, at 
98-100; James, supra note 24, at 617. 
28. Ibid. 
29. See Kahn-Freund, supra note 14, at 85-86, 98-100; Livingston, Survival of Tort 
Actions-A Proposal For California Legislation, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 74 (1949). 
30. See, e.g., A.LA. CODE tit. 7, § 150 (1958); DEL. CoDJ;: ANN. tit. 10, § 3704 (1953); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 320.549 (1950); WASH. R.Ev. CODE § 4.20.060 (1957). For statutes 
that presently do not allow the survival of such a claim see, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT, ANN. 
§ 153-1-9 (1963); CAL. CIV. CODE § 956. 
31. McCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 77, 79, 118 (1935); see note 29 supra and accom-
panying text. 
32. See, e.g., Florida E.C. Ry. v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 149 So. 631 (1933); Grimes 
v. United Elec. Rys., 58 R.I. 458, 193 Atl. 740 (1937); CAL. CIV. CODE § 956; CoLO. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 153-1-9 (1963); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-1-8 (1956). 
33. See Livingston, supra note 29, for arguments that brought about the change in 
CAL. CIV. CoDE § 956; Seymour v. Richardson, 194 Va. 709, 75 S.E.2d 77 (1953) uses 
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-628.1 (1950) to prevent survival of pain and suffering even though 
the suit was filed before death. 
34. Two such cases that recently troubled the English courts are noted in 25 
MODERN L. R.Ev. 108, 479 (1962). 
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tive capacity of the injured party to be compensated. Some states 
might except the unconscious victim from the running of the stat-
ute of limitations under a disability provision such as mental 
incapacity, for the victim is unconscious, unaware of his rights, and 
unable to pursue his remedies.35 The suit could thus be delayed 
until it was determined whether he was likely to regain conscious-
ness. If the suit had to be brought before consciousness was re-
gained, evidence as to the possibility of future consciousness must 
be presented. If it is established that the victim may regain con-
sciousness and may be able to enjoy psychic pleasures, compensa-
tion should be given whereas if recovery of consciousness is impos-
sible, compensation here, as in the case of the deceased victim, would 
be inappropriate and should be denied. 
Before a separate category of damages for the curtailment of 
life expectancy can be applied, the basic reasons for courts' denying 
such damages-the speculative nature of this loss, the difficulty of 
its measurement, and the danger of excessive and arbitrary assess-
ments by sympathetic juries-must be overcome. The courts' pres-
ent desire for certainty is normally a strict requirement only in 
establishing the fact of damages, and is relaxed with respect to their 
extent.36 The plaintiff should have the burden of proving, by use 
of advanced medical prognosis and testimony as to his prior physical 
condition, that his span of life has been shortened and the approxi-
mate extent of the abridgment. In assessing the amount of recovery, 
the number of years, as predicted by the expert, without more will 
not be enough, for this would reduce the award to a mere actuarial 
damage scale. Rather, evidence as to the quality of the life lost must 
be brought forth.37 Facts concerning the person, his circumstances, 
prospects, habits, temperament, and attitudes should be required so 
as to enable the jury to determine the chances of future happiness 
had the life not been shortened. The jury should be instructed to 
make an objective estimate from the evidence rather than being 
35. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Keller, 193 F. Supp. 733, 735 (D. Ore. 1961); Kyle v. Green 
Acres at Verona, Inc., 44 N.J. 100, 207 A.2d 513 (1965); Rust Eng'r Co. v. Ramsey, 194 
Va. 975, 982, 76 S.E.2d 195, 196 (1953); CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 352; !LL. REv. STAT. 
ch. 83, § 22 (1963); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 609.15 (1948); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW § 208; 
VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 8-30 (1950). If consciousness were regained, the procedural advan-
tage of having an aware and participating plaintiff should outweigh any fears the 
court might have of such a claim and its evidence growing stale. Also, the defendant's 
loss of the protection of the statute of limitations is not totally inequitable in a case 
where his wrongdoing created the plaintiff's disability and where he is likely to real-
ize the seriousness of the damage and can begin to prepare his defense immediately 
whether or not a complaint has been filed. 
36. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, rehearing denied, 329 U.S. 
822 (1946); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931); 
NLRB v. Kartarik, Inc., 227 F.2d 190 (8th Cir. 1955); General Fin. Corp. v. Dillon, 172 
F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1949). 
37. See Benham v. Gambling, [1941] A.C. 157, 166; Smith, supra note 4, at 809-12. 
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bound by the victim's subjective evaluation.38 All evidence must be 
presented in open court and be subjected to the test of cross-exami-
nation. Where evidence as to the prospects of a predominately 
happy future is uncertain or questionable, smaller awards should be 
made.39 Finally, the award should not be reduced to a mere formal 
grant as has been done in England,40 but must remain flexible, 
within realistic limits, to fit both the quantity and quality of the life 
lost. 
Exhorbitant awards are not a necessary result. The judge should 
carefully instruct the jury so as to evoke its prudence and reason. 
He should define and illustrate what factors are to be considered or 
discounted and explain how damages for curtailment of life expec-
tancy is but one category of damages distinct from other categories. 
Unlike instructions which ask the jurors to consider curtailment of 
life in determining other categories of damages,41 such instructions 
would clarify the jury's task by breaking down the total injury into 
areas common to their experience. Also, direct recovery for loss of 
the expectation of life would prevent the injustice of one jury co-
vertly including such an award under some other label of damages 
while another jury ignores it. The jury has been deemed competent 
to deal with such immeasurable and speculative damages as pain 
and suffering, fear, and loss of consortium and therefore it should 
be deemed competent to measure damages for curtailment of life 
as well. If the legislature could be induced to act, specific limits 
could be set as an arbitrary ceiling to prevent abuses of the award.42 
Finally, the award should be separate under the special heading of 
"damages for the curtailment of life" so as to reveal clearly the ac-
tual workings of the jury, thereby facilitating judicial review, re-
mittur, or reversal when such an award is unsupported by the evi-
dence. 43 
38. Benham v. Gambling, [1941] A.C. 157, 167. 
39. Ibid. 
40. See note 14 supra. 
41. See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra. 
42. Smith, supra note 4, at 823, suggests a ceiling for curtailment of prospective 
life of $5,000 for persons over 45 years of age and $10,000 for children. Plant, Damages 
for Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 200 (1958), suggests such a limit for pain and 
suffering awards. 
43. See Smith, supra note 4, at 795. 
